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Shakespeare and Posthumanist Theory 
By Karen Raber 
London: Bloomsbury, 2018
Reviewer: Jean E. Feerick 
"The human is already inhuman" (145). quips Karen Raber, 
echo­ing the rhythms of Bruno Latour's famous title that delivered 
actor network theory to the world amid a call to rethink the 
division of culture and nature as instead an assemblage. 1 In her 
new book for the Arden Shakespeare and Theory series, Raber 
takes up the dynamic and expansive field of posthumanism and 
lhe cluster of theories that subtend its philosophical position and 
demonslrales their relevance for and intersections with 
Renaissance culture, as embodied not only by Shakespeare but 
by a range of arl prac­titioners, philosophers, rhetoricians, and 
scientists. Flouting the unity that poslhumanist theorists tend 
lo assign Renaissance humanism, which Raber sardonically 
mocks as a view of the era as a "premodern bondage machine" 
(4), she builds her claims oul from an assertion she shares with 
a recent volume edited by Scoll Maisano and Joseph Campana 
lhal Renaissance humanism was a set of practices that yielded 
less a stable notion of the human, than a compellingly self-divided 
way of reading that makes it a compel­ling contributor to 
poslhumanisl praclice. 2 
Of course, this can be confusing if we construe the" post" in 
post­humanism as denoting temporal sequence-seeming lo call 
up the paradox of turning the "preface" of early modernity inlo 
the "pro­logue" to our now. But Raber urges us to bracket linear 
models of 
thinking-which are themselves symptoms of the "exceptionalist" 
paradigm posthumanism assaults-and associate the prefix instead 
with an inclination Lo scatter the category of the human, construing 
it as an ontology that is ongoing, mediated, extended, unstable, and 
always in progress as it seeks lo define itself in opposition Lo a mov­
ing assemblage of "others." In exposing and exploring the breadth 
of human embeddedness in and attachment to various objects, 
environments, and creatures in the work of Shakespeare and oth­
ers, Raber reads Renaissance materials as providing important 
access to a moment that was open to the paradoxes of human iden­
tity, one not yet seeking cover in Cartesian dualism and the myth 
of a transcendent reasoning faculty it helped to fuel. As she argues, 
"Renaissance humanism did not (always) seek to extract humanity 
from the mesh of beings in the world" (21). Rather, in her account, 
it understood and at times even celebrated an awareness that the 
human has never been fully human, although it is also true that 
Enlightenment humanism has sometimes obscured our access to 
this point. 
Raber's book is lively, informative, theoretical, and expressive of 
sharp close readings. I see it as a treasure trove for critics and stu­
dents alike. One of the things I found particularly exciting about 
her account of posthumanism is how she treats this capacious the­
ory as a kind of switchboard that opens pathways to and from a 
range of philosophical and political projects, including eco­
criticism, new materialism, animal studies, phenomenology, 
extended and distributed cognition, embodied identity, disability 
theory, and cyborg studies, among others. Raber has distilled the 
wisdom of an impressive range of theorists-from Hayles and 
Braidolli to Derrida, Delueze, Haraway, Bennett, and Latour­
presenting each in digestible chunks for her readers, while also 
placing them in relation to one another. This is one of her particu­
lar skills-identifying and clarifying Lhe salient points of complex 
theoretical arguments and then putting them in dialogue with one 
another. Toward this end, she animates Haraway's critique of 
Deleuze and her embrace of Latour. And she narrates Derrida and 
Agamben as they respond to Descartes. She is on very sound foot­
ing philosophically, although she occasionally apologizes for con­
densing whole traditions into a few paragraphs. Since that is 
precisely what the volume calls for, she meets the challenge with 
aplomb. She also tracks the development and significance of whole 
fields in Renaissance studies such as humoralism, phenomenology 
and animal studies, showing how they contribute lo and echo the 
foundational claims of poslhurnanism. Reading her book as I was 
designing a graduate course on Ecocriticism and Renaissance Liter­
ature, I came to see it as a terrific resource for students who might 
need a crisp account of Latour, Bogosl, or Agamben lo allow them 
lo join the critical conversation. 
Her chapters, too, had a design that emblematized the feel of net­
works and assemblages in action, as opposed to taut, linear argu­
ments set up to overturn earlier readings or critical models. Raber 
has opted lo creatively cluster her chapters around a theoretical 
approach, such as animal studies or cyborg theory; a defining trope, 
such as the face as interchange between body and mind or the cen­
taur as emblem of the human/animal dyad; and a set of texts, 
including Shakespeare's plays but also a range of other cultural 
artifacts. Al limes, she dives deeply into readings of the plays, as 
she does in her first chapter in grappling with King Lear's "queer 
cosmos," a phrase she borrows from Laurie Shannon. 3 Elsewhere, 
her method shifts, as when she turns to well-charted areas such as 
animal studies or theories of embodiment, which have been deeply 
mined by recent criticism and have yielded multiple rich, capa­
cious studies in article and monograph form. In chapter 3, for 
instance, she spends less time in providing a new reading of a play 
than in threading connections between the work of posthumanist 
theorists like N.  Katherine Hayles and Stacy Alaimo and that of 
early modernists like Gail Paster, Bruce Smith, and Holly Dugan 
in areas like humoral embodiment, phenomenology, or disability 
theory. As she demonstrates in accounting for scholarship that 
spans roughly two decades, early modern critics have been un­
covering in Renaissance texts a conception of the human that is 
dispersed, extended, and embedded, one that bears uncanny re­
semblance to posthumanism and supports her thesis that returning 
to this era can creatively inflect and enrichen the posthumanist 
project, as well as revitalize study of Shakespeare by posing new 
questions and making us alert lo new archives and angles. 
In the second half of the book, she explores the animal and 
cyborg dimensions of human identity for Renaissance writ­
ers. Chapter 4 charts the ubiquity and conceptual centrality of 
animals-or creaturely life-in Shakespeare's plays, concluding 
with a discussion of Tilus Andronicus. Notable in this chapter is 
her discussion of the name that Shakespeare's character Chiron 
shares with the eldest centaur of Greek mythology, etymologically 
linked lo the word for "hand," which identifies and explains the 
figure's longstanding association with skill in the use of tools, 
instruments, and other objects lo denote his human-like mastery 
over nature. Compellingly, Shakespeare's character inverts all such 
associations when he unleashes bestial violence on Rome, begin­
ning with his ravagement of Lavinia, thereby dismantling the cate­
gory of the human and exposing violence as the foundation upon 
which civilization rests. Raber's last full chapter lacks toward the 
inhuman, exploring imaginative engagements with the shaping 
powers of technology in a Renaissance era defined by a "seismic 
shift in the speed and nature of knowledge transmission" (130). 
Discussions of Giovanni Bracelli's and Albrecht Dtirer's geometric 
renderings of the human body as an assemblage of object-like 
parts-a kind of robot-dovetails into a discussion of the cyborgian 
armored warrior of Shakespeare's history plays, which stage a 
relentless twinning of men and metal on the battlefield. In donning 
armor, wielding weapons, and commanding men, Shakespeare's 
warriors operate as "extended, fortified beings ... made up of other 
human and non-human stuff" (152-53). They morph, that is, into 
iron men. 
And yet, it was in the sustained close reading that com prises her 
first chapter on Lear that I found Raber to be at her best in enacting 
the value that posthumanist theories and reading practices have for 
canonical plays. Itself a play that has been at the center of im por­
tant articles from the perspective of animal studies (Shannon) and 
eco-critical approaches (Egan and Mentz). Lear here is yet made lo 
articulate a new kind of posthumanist perspective, as Raber weighs 
the shifting representations of the natural world that express the 
characters' disparate moral and political sensibilities, from the self­
interested cunning of an Edmund to the ethical certainty of an 
Edgar or Kent. Positioning herself against theories of orderly and 
hierarchical life made famous by Tillyard and aligning her reading 
instead with theories of tumult and disharmony implicitly ad­
vanced long ago by Arthur Lovejoy and, more recently, by Steve 
Mentz, Raber argues that the play stages the strategies of control 
that humans use lo counter the overwhelming experience of being 
confronted by "hyperobjects," the term Timothy Morton has 
assigned to material forces so large and powerful that they con­
found human conceptualization.4 In the case of Lear, the dance 
between assertions of an ordered and providential universe and the 
abiding sense of nature as an unwieldy, entropic force that haunts 
the play serves as a tacit acknowledgment by the dramatist that 
powerful cosmic activities leave us bewildered, grasping al organ­
izing patterns to hold chaos at bay. For Raber, the play reduces its 
characters to the "humility of unknowing" (52), a posture that she 
sees as powerfully emblematized by the stumbling, foolish figure of 
Gloucester, who smells and feels his way to Dover, a mere grovel­
ing creature unable lo distinguish life from death. Notably, Raber 
returns to the figure of Gloucester in her brief final chapter, identi­
fying the unknowing man-animal as a fitting emblem of posl­
humanism, one who disperses the comforting fictions of "life, love, 
and family" (161) that gather around the "plays' charismatic mega­
fauna like Cordelia, Edgar, Kent, or Lear himself" (161). 
In threading the theory of hyperobjects into this play, Raber ech­
oes a question once raised by A. C. Bradley who asked, in effect, 
why must Gloucester head all the way lo Dover to die? Raber fol­
lows this lead in speculating that part of Dover's appeal lies in its 
recent devastation at the hands of a massive earthquake in 1580 
that tumbled houses and spawned tsunamis, seeming to strike al 
the very symbols of human civilization. Shakespeare's characters 
evoke this place repeatedly in the play, Raber proposes, as a sort of 
return lo and evocation of a moment of collective trauma. I confess, 
I was intrigued by these details, not knowing of these associations 
or events. But I also found the shift to topicality as a guiding heuris­
tic at a key moment in the chapter to sit in uneasy relation with 
Raber's dexterous use of more agile theoretical models elsewhere. 
Topicality has, it should be said, become a preferred analytical 
mode for some, if not all eco-critics, who seem lo gravitate toward 
and privilege empirical facts-pollution, deforestation, fossil 
fuels-to bridge early modernity to the "now" of ecological dev­
astation. But Raber understands that even as eco-criticism and 
poslhumanism overlap, they are not contiguous and may even 
occasionally be in tension. I see such a tension in her turn lo the 
topical as a kind of key that grants privileged access lo the text, pre­
cisely because it seems to underscore a way of thinking that privi­
leges "turning points or historical pivots" (159) and thereby betrays 
a bid for epistemological mastery that is at odds with posthuman­
ism. I applaud instead the skeptical posture Raber elsewhere 
applies to "stabilizing" readings that concede a privileged view lo 
the modern critic, preferring lo guard against totalizing critical 
moves in order lo underscore the presence of a range of actants his­
torically, whether ontologically or epistemologically. Her final brief 
chapter, in facl, is an eloquent call for such a praclice, which she 
describes as a "slow, disabled, bul environmentally aware posthu­
manism," which "arises out of millions of cellular pulses across the 
strands of culture, Lhe academy and individuals over a longer tem­
poral arc" (160-61). It is a poslhumanism not limiled lo Shake­
speareans, nor lo practitioners of Lhe humanilies, nor even to 
humankind. She may be appealing lo a scholarly version of the Par­
liament of Things famously evoked by Latour as a working model 
for a more equilable political practice in which the voice and inter­
esls of all aclanls-human and nonhuman-affected by a given pol­
icy gain representation in the polilical process. Raber's book 
helpfully poinls us in a similar direction for our scholarly practice, 
urging us to be on the lookout for lhose moments when "human 
subjectivity is king and lhe earth [or lhe past] merely an objecl to 
know" (49). She concludes by puzzling over the potentially crip­
pling paradox for lhe kind of posthumanism she advocales, which 
is a deeply ethical and political practice as well as a theoretical 
model. If there is no human subject to stand as lhe "origin of 
decision-making" and the engine of ethical practice, how do post­
humanists purporl "lo transform and improve human beings-if 
not the beings themselves, then their effects on their fellow crea­
tures and on the places we have to live" (25), the goal that inspires 
much of this work? In response, Raber fittingly provides another 
question: "Might we need both a strategic subjectivity and a strate­
gic exceptionalism lo put ethics into praclice as politics or law?" 
(162). Open-ended, qualified, dialogical, and performative-lhis 
and the other questions with which she concludes her study invite 
us lo add our voices and our studies to the network of "millions of 
cellular pulses" (160) which she identifies with the slow work of 
undoing human exceplionalism. 
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